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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES

THOMAS O'CONNELL HOLSTEIN*

On December 8, 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Finland's resolution requesting the International Law Commission to "take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses with a view to its progressive development and
codification."' The Commission agreed to undertake the investigation
upon receipt of the Secretariat's supplementary report. 2 Due to its Agenda,
several years may elapse before the Commission produces a draft convention on the subject.
In 1972 the Commission stressed the urgency and complexity of the
pollution problem, and requested the Secretariat to make special reference
to pollution in its report. The area of non-navigational uses, as generally
defined, is rampant with problems similar to those encountered at the unsuccessful Hague Conference of 1930,4 since it includes state responsibility
5
for exterritorial injury caused by the pollution of international rivers.
This observation leads to the main theme of this article-that the Commission should include state responsibility for pollution in its codification
of general state responsibility, and limit its codification of international
watercourses to specific non-navigational uses. Pollution is not a use, but
the result of use. Dealing with both subjects under the same topic can
only hamper the Commission's codification effort, and would lead to unnecessary duplication.
For twenty years the International Law Commission has sought
elusively to codify the law of state responsibility. 6 Its unsuccessful attempts
concentrate on state responsibility for injuries to aliens within state territory. 7 The work of the Commission from 1954-1962, does not render
much help to determine the responsibility of a state for action within its
territory which causes injury in another State.' The Commission neglected
*B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., De Paul University College of Law;
Diploma, International Law, Environmental Law, Cambridge University, Queens
College, Cambridge; Associate Professor of Law, Lewis University College of Law.
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this problem except in the area of guerrilla activities.9 It so emphasized
the rights of aliens injured within state territory that the Commission's
work during this period applies only remotely to extraterritorial effects of
national activities. The Commission's Sub-Committee on State Responsibility under the chairmanship of Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, has
abandoned this limited approach and is studying the general aspects of
state responsibility, i.e., the situation resulting from a state's non-fulfillment
of an international legal obligation, regardless of the obligation's nature
and the matter to which it relates. 10
According to the Commission's most recent draft, a state is responsible for internationally wrongful acts or omissions which breach its international obligations and are attributable to it." Only international law
12
may characterize an act as wrongful
An internationally wrongful act, as defined in Art. 3, contains a
subjective and an objective element. 13 The objective element concerns the
act itself, i.e., what degree of pollution breaches the international obligation of a state.
Is there any customary international law which, in absence of treaty,
would characterize a state's pollution of international watercourses as
wrongful?
There is "extensive State practice, precedent, and doctrine," to use
the language in Art. 15 of the Statutc of the Commission. However, "there
exists no multilateral treaty or convention defining in detail the rights and
obligations of States in the prevention of the pollution of water. A study
of the attitude adopted by international law must therefore rely on different sources, such as treaties concerned with boundary waters or other
watercourses of common interest to several States, international legal practice, written opinions and views and recommendations adopted by inter4
national bodies."'
The Secretary General's earlier Report, Legal Problems Relating to
the Utilization and Use of International Rivers,' 5 lists over 250 treaties
applicable to the non-navigational uses of international rivers. On this
basis, some publicists have declared moot the subject of extraterritorial
injury caused by the pollution of international rivers. 16 While this position is academically tenable, it is speculative.
Numerous treaties with pollution provisions, mostly involving European and North American states, merely evidence the general principle
7
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.1
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No international commission established to administer an international watercourse possesses judicial power to enforce, police, or award compensation due to fault of a signatory. Compensation, usually obtained
through the co-operative association of the international commission members, implies no admission of responsibility in a judicial sense. Although*
the state practice of many nations demonstrates a repeated pattern of compliance with commission recommendations, this does not change the "voluntarily adopted" action of states into acts of obligatory compliance. The
numerous international commissions are confined to investigation and recommendation. Supernational Environmental Control Agencies' 8 and surrender of compulsory jurisdiction to any tribunal are not predictable, 19
since states fear adjudication or compulsory arbitration of disputes aris20
ing out of the important use of water resources in the national interest.
Geographically, sixty states 21 qualify as "basin" states. 22 Many basins are not subjects to any agreement. Existent treaties do not make
pollution a recognized legal cause of action between signatories. 24 The
customary law regulating the pollution of international watercourses is
undeveloped3 5 There is no application of the law that some publicists and
associations say exists. There are a few international cases in analogous
situations 26 and a large number of multilateral treaties, but the principles
embodied in them do not bind non-party states by operation of custom.
the
They have no obligatory effect on non-signatories which Art. 2 of
27
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines as third states.
23

What is the legal effect of the relevant treaties which exist?
The role played by custom in sometimes extending the application
of rules contained in a treaty beyond the contracting states is
well recognized. A treaty concluded between certain states may
formulate a rule, or establish a territorial, fluvial or maritime
regime which afterwards comes to be generally accepted by other
'States as customary international law, as for example the Hague
28
Conventions regarding the rules of land warfare.
This process is not restricted to law-making treaties. When it occurs,
custom binds third states who are not parties to such treaties. The treaties
themselves have no effect on third states. According to Art. 38 of the
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties: "Nothing precludes a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law, recognized as such." 29 However, the principles
embodied in treaties relevant to the pollution of international watercourses
are not so recognized at this time.
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Is a third state required to refrain from activity within its territory
which might result in pollution and cause territorial injury? The general
rule is that parties to a treaty cannot impose an obligation on a third
30
state without its consent, pacta tertiis nec nocent ne prosunt A treaty
binds a third state only if the parties intend to apply it to third states, and
if the third state expressly agrees. 31 These rules may not answer the question if the treaties concerned have "objective" effects, or create an "objective regime."
The International Law Commission in its preparatory work on the
Vienna Convention discussed extensively the effect of treaties on third
states. The Commission did rot include treaties which have "objective effects" and provide for "objective regimes" in their final draft. This is
most unfortunate, since the treaties providing for the non-navigational uses
of international watercourses may be in this category. If so, these treaties
have greater authority to place32 obligations on third states than regular
multilateral or bilateral treaties.
Every treaty establishes a contractual relationship between the parties.
In this sense, all treaties establish a kind of "international regime." However, the question of "objective effects" truly arises only in regard to a
special type of treaty. 33 Art. 23 of the Commission's preliminary draft on
the Law of Treaties defines this class of treaty.34
The parties must intend to create a regime for the general interest
in a particular river or region. This river or region must be subject to the
territorial competence of one or more of them, but need not include all
such states. 35 Treaties on the non-navigational uses of international watercourses meet these criteria.
Treaties which create objective regimes differ from law-making
treaties. No state has greater competence than any other in the subject
matter of most law making treaties. 36 River treaties deal with states possessing special competence due to geographical position in a region where
the subject matter is located. Are treaties which include pollution articles
and which establish a regime for the non-navigational use of international
watercourses in this category?
Sir Humphrey Waldoch, Special Rapporteur for the Commission on
the Law of Treaties, asserts that "the mere fact that certain provisions of
a treaty may constitute an objective regime does not mean that they are
' 37
If the corrolto be regarded as independent of the rest of the treaty.
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lary of this is true, then pollution provisions included in treaties on the
navigation of international rivers have the same character as the general
treaty.
According to the International Law Commission, treaties providing
for the freedom of navigation in international rivers are treaties creating
"objective regimes." 38 Treaties relevant to the pollution of international
rivers have their inception in, and have evolved from, pollution articles
in treaties on navigational use.
Many modern uses of international watercourses were unknown during the initial development of the law pertaining to the use of international
rivers. 39 Since navigation was the principle use of such rivers, the riparian
doctrine 40 and the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, 41 which
are fundamental to establish state responsibility for extraterritorial pollution injury, were first applied to states in the area of navigational use.42
Prior to World War I, navigational use was of such importance that international law did not recognize non-navigable rivers flowing through more
than one state as subjects of international concern.
In referring to international watercourses, the Final Act of Congress
of Vienna adopted the phrase "Navigable rivers or streams which separate
or traverse several states. '43 The same phrase was used in the Treaty of
Paris of 1856. 4 4 Navigation continued to be the dominant concern 45
46
through the middle and latter half of the nineteenth century.

The emergence of non-navigational uses began around 1890 when
states enacted various treaties with specific provisions to protect fishing.47
Such treaties had pollution provisions, but only as a secondary feature.
The term "International Rivers" appears initially in the 1919-1920
Peace Treaties. In this context the term applied only to the navigable sections of rivers which offered more than one state access to the sea. 4 In
1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice upheld this definition
in the River Oder case.49 The 1921 Barcelona Statute, although adopting
the term "navigable waterways of international concern," emphasized the
growing importance of uses other than navigation. 50 Two years later, the
Convention Relating to the Development of Hydroelectric Power Affecting
More Than One State further demonstrated the new importance of non51
navigational uses.
The treaties relevant to the pollution of international rivers and to
non-navigational uses, because of their nature and evolution, are treaties
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which create objective regimes. The question of local or particular custom
is especially important if these treaties create "objective regimes." 5 2 Such
treaties by their nature attempt to create a regional custom which may
differ from general custom.
The development of state responsibility for extraterritorial injury
"depends on further inroads being made on some of the principles surrounding state sovereignty." 5 3 General principles embodied in treaties on
the use of international rivers imply such inroads, but these principles are
not generally accepted to the extent that they mandatorily bind third states
according to the force of general custom. 5 4 Is this also true of local custom
as regards third states sharing the same geographic region?
Although the Right of Passage case55 and the Asylum case5 6 hold differently, the International Law Commission has asserted that local custom
binds third states in the same operational manner as general custom, and
57
does not require express consent of the third state.
The pollution of international watercourses is uniquely suited to a
local custom and objective regime approach. No uniform international pollution standard is possible, other than a vague one, because of the physical
and climatic differences throughout the world.58
If the Commission produces an acceptable convention on state responsibility, it will define an internationally wrongful act and its ramifications.
Since such criteria would apply to pollution which causes extraterritorial
injury, a special inquiry into this area under the topic of non-navigational
uses is redundant. Extraterritorial injury, regardless of cause, is a subset
of general state responsibility. Art. X and X159 of the Helsinki Rules deal
specifically with extraterritorial pollution injury, but fail to define precisely a uniform international pollution standard.
The Helsinki Rules, and the Council of Europe Draft Convention of
1969 prohibit "pollution... causing or likely to cause substantial injury
in the territory of any other contracting State." 60 What is a "substantial
injury?"
According to the International Law Association's Comment to Art. X
of the Helsinki Rules "an injury is considered substantial if it materially
interferes with or prevents reasonable use of the water. ' 61 The comment
further defines material interference as action not in accord with equitable
utilization. According to Art. IV of the Helsinki Rules, equitable utilization entitles a basin state to "a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin. ' 62 None
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of this circuitous verbiage defines the degree of injury which renders a
state responsible.63 The Helsinki Rules merely restate the principle sic
utere tuo.
This principle is too vacuous. It does not impose obligations on third
states according to general international custom. 6 4 Thus, third state viola-

tion of the principle is not an internationally wrongful act. The possible
exception is an objective regime treaty which may establish local custom
for third states.
State practice, as reflected in treaties, demonstrates no obligatory
compliance with the principle sic utere tuo.
There is a long history of treaties proscribing pollution of international watercourses. However, a study of them does not reveal a uniform
international standard of pollution injury rendering another state responsible for such acts.65 Some merely provide for mutual concern over resources or mention pollution as something the parties must take reasonable
steps to avoid. Others prohibit certain effects of pollution. Most treaties
66
refer conflicts to a non-judicial international commission.
In 1909, the United States enacted a treaty with Great Britain, representing Canada, concerning the boundary waters and Great Lakes between
the United States and Canada. It typifies the treaties establishing international commissions and relating to the non-navigational use of international watercourses. According to Art. IV, "Waters flowing across the
boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other." However, both countries disclaimed responsibility
67
for extraterritorial injury.
The treaty established the International Joint Commission which has
"come to be regarded with some degree of envy by other nations confronted by problems of international river development. ' '6
" Such praise
is suspect since the International Joint Commission is primarily involved
in investigation and research. It must wait until one of the parties requests
it to investigate a problem. In addition, according to Art. IX, the "reports
of the Commission shall not be regarded as decisions of the question or
matter so submitted, either on the facts or the law and shall in no way
have the character of an arbitral award. 6 9
State practice between the United States and Canada during the last
sixty years renders evidence of an opposite nature. Both countries have
refrained from taking action without Commission authorization.70 Their
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compliance with recommendations indicates their unofficial judicial effect. 7' This dichotomy between the lack of judicial power and the record
of conformity with Commission recommendations testifies to the excellent
cooperation between the states, but to nothing more. Despite contrary practice, the treaty is "opposed to the concept of an international body with
administrative and enforcement functions." 72 Because the parties officially
deny responsibility for extraterritorial injury, adherence to the principle
see utere tuo is not obligatory.
The treaties on pollution and non-navigational uses of international
watercourses inherently reflect the primary concerns of the geographic region where the resources are located. Thus, except for a general incorporation of sec utere tuo, there is little uniformity. This is the primary reason
why local custom and regional agreements are more suitable than an international convention.
At least a study of the treaties reveals a similar approach among
states of diverse political orientation and ideological differences. 73 Such
unity would probably continue in the area of cooperative non-navigational
use, but would certainly break down on the question of state responsibility,
considering the disagreement between communist and western states in
this area. 74
The situation surrounding the United States testing of a hydrogen
bomb on Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific in 1954 demonstrates the general
practice of states in the area of state responsibilities for extraterritorial
injury.
On March 1, 1954 the United States exploded a hydrogen bomb in
the Marshall Islands. The test resulted in injuries to Japanese fishermen,
75
and destroyed over 175 tons of fish, disrupting the Japanese market.
In January 1955, the United States gave monetary compensation to
the Japanese government but stated that:
The Government of the United States of America has made clear
that it is prepared to make monetary compensation as an additional expression of its concern and regret over the injuries sustained .... The United States of America hereby tenders, ex
gratia, to the Government of Japan, without reference to the
question of legal liability, the sum of two million dollars for purposes of compensation for the injuries or damages sustained as a
result of nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954...
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It is the understanding of the Government of the United States
of America that the Government of Japan, in accepting the
tendered sum of two million dollars, does so in full settlement of
any and all claims against the United States of America or its
agents, nationals, or judicial entities on the part of Japan and its
nationals and juridical entities for any and all injuries, losses, or
76
damages arising out of the said nuclear tests.
The practice of the United States in this instance is representative of
practice generally in this area, since the United States in making reparation, declared explicitly that it did so ex gratia and not as a matter of
legal liability.
The Helsinki Rules adopt a broad scope, encompassing utilization of
river basin resources as well as reparation for injury. This is too expansive for realistic codification. The Commission would avoid future problems if it restricted its inquiry to non-navigational uses and included
extraterritorial injury caused by pollution of international rivers in its
attempted codification of general state responsibility.
The codification of the law of international rivers, to interpret Art.
13 of the Charter and Statute of the Commission, includes both codification and development of the law. 77 The Commission must not confine itself to simple exposition of existing law. The question most relevant to
the Helsinki Rules and to the Commission's task is: How far may developmental efforts go before such progressive activity becomes self-defeating?
Also, at what point must the Commission stop to avoid sacrificing the
potential agreement of states in the cause of development?
The Commission has already stated that the Helsinki Rules are too
78
academic and Utopian.
Private codification is less complex and less restrictive than the Commission's official codification. 79 Commission codification is an international effort to secure eventual state acceptance in the form of an international convention. Thus, the Commission must exercise caution in developmental areas. Codification is intricate and time consuming. Art. 23
of the Statute of the Commission requires the following preliminary stages
enroute to codification. First, the Commission must prepare a report and
submit it to the General Assembly. Second, the General Assembly must
pass a resolution adopting the report. Third, the General Assembly must
recommend that its members adopt the report in the form of a Convention, or that the United Nations convene a conference to conclude a convention.
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A draft convention on international watercourses would be more
readily acceptable if the convention avoided the controversial area of state
responsibility for extraterritorial injury caused by pollution.
The subjective element in Art. 380 of the Commission's latest draft
on state responsibility asks whether a wrongful act is attributable to the
state. Art. 581 and 682 provide that Acts and Commissions of state organs, whether executive, legislative, or administrative, are attributable to
a state. However, most activities polluting international rivers and causing extraterritorial injury are private acts within a state. According to
the general rule, acts by private parties do not result in state responsibility.83
Art. X of the Helsinki Rules adopts the position of direct state responsibility for all pollution "originating within a territory of state" which
the rules make no distincwould cause substantial injury. In this regard,
84
activities.
private
and
tion between public
Acts of omission are particularly important in attributing private
polluting acts within state territory to the state. The Corfu Channel case,
and the Trail Smelter Case are specially significant because they lay the
foundation for such attribution.
In October 1946 two British naval vessels struck mines while sailing
through the Corfu Channel resulting in serious personal injuries including loss of life to some personnel on board, destruction of one ship, and
serious damage to the other. The incident occurred in Albanian territorial
waters. Albania had not laid the minefield, but Albania had not warned
the British ships of its existence. The state referred the case to the International Court of Justice. The court held that Albania was responsible
for the injury because it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States. 85 This statement by the Court is the major basis for asserting that
a state is obliged to refrain from acts which may cause extraterritorial
86
injury.
The main issue in the case which concerns us is the attribution of a
wrongful act, resulting in state responsibility, to Albania. The crucial matter is the imputation of knowledge to Albania which the Court held as an
adequate basis for state responsibility. This case establishes the tenet that
insufficient efforts on the part of a state to keep informed of conditions
which may result in injury to other states is sufficient basis for responsibility.
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The British alleged that the injury had been caused by mines which
formed part of a minefield laid in the Channel with the knowledge of Albania. Albania denied such knowledge. In finding that Albania did have
knowledge, the Court held that the minefield's location within the Albanian
territorial sea was not in itself sufficient to prove knowledge. "This fact
by itself and apart from other circumstances neither involves prima facie
responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof."87 However, the Court found
it difficult to believe that a mine field could have been laid in Albanian
territorial waters without Albania's detection. Consequently Albania either
had actual knowledge, founded on circumstantial evidence, or had failed
88
to exercise proper vigilance within its territory.
There are elements of this case which weaken its invocation to support state responsibility for extraterritorial injury. The most glaring fault
is that the injury occurred in Albanian territory. Therefore, it is in line
with the scope of the Commission's earlier work on state responsibility
regarding injuries to aliens. The case involved two governments. Therefore, it may not be as applicable to private parties suffering extraterritorial
injury caused by a state's failure to exercise proper vigilance, and even
less so in similar cases between two private parties of different states. However, the case does establish a basis to hold a state responsible for extraterritorial injury caused by the pollution of international rivers, if the
injurious activity occurred within state territory due to insufficient supervision of such activity by the agencies of the state.
The Trail Smelter Case is the only case dealing with extraterritorial
injury caused by pollution. An ad hoc tribunal composed of representatives from Belgium, United States and Canada rendered the judgement in
1941. The United States alleged that air pollution from a privately owned
smelter plant located in Canada had caused damage in the state of Washington. The Tribunal held that:
- ..under the principle of international law, as well as the law of
the United States no state has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.8 9

This holding is of questionable importance, since the dispute was submitted to the tribunal on the basis of a special convention.90 Under this
convention, Canada voluntarily accepted state responsibility for private
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conduct occurring within its territory. However, this case is still of special
importance because the tribunal declared Canada responsible under international law and "[alpart from" the convention.9 1
This holding is opposed to the general rule that a state is not responsible for the acts of private individuals. 92 In this case both states
voluntarily assumed an entirely private claim. The United States espoused
the injuries to its citizens as injuries to its territory, and Canada voluntarily
assumed liability for private acts within its territory. Such voluntary
assumption and the holding of the Tribunal does not change customary
international law in the area of state responsibility. It does, however,
supply evidence to support the position that a state is responsible for
extraterritorial injury 'by pollution originating within its territory even
if the activity if privately conducted.
It may be convenient, in 'conclusion, to summarize briefly the submissions of this article:
1. The area of non-navigational uses, as generally defined, is
rampant with problems similar to those encountered at the unsuccessful
Hague Conference of 1930, since it includes state responsibility for extraterritorial injury caused 'by the pollution of international rivers.
2. Numerous treaties with pollution provisions merely evidence the
general principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.93 They have no
obligatory effect on non-signatories.
3. The treaties relevant to the pollution of international rivers and
to non-navigational uses, because of their nature and evolution, are treaties
which create objective regimes. They have greater authority to bind third
states than most multilateral treaties.
4. The pollution of international watercourses is uniquely suited to
a local custom and objective regime approach. No uniform international
pollution standard is possible, other than a vague one, because of the
physical and climatic differences throughout the world.
5. If the Commission produces an acceptable convention on state
responsibility, it will define an internationally wrongful act and its
ramifications. Since such criteria would apply to pollution which causes
extra-territorial injury, a special inquiry into this area under the topic
of non-navigational uses is redundant.
6. State practice demonstrates no obligatory compliance with the
principle sic utere tuo.
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7. The Helsinki Rules adopt a broad scope, encompassing utilization
of river basin resources as well as reparation for injury. This is too
expansive for realistic codification. The Commission would avoid future
problems if it restricted its inquiry to non-navigational uses, and included
extraterritorial injury caused by pollution of international rivers in its
attempted codification of general state responsibility. Pollution is not
a use, but a result of use. A draft convention on international watercourses would be more readily acceptable if the convention avoided the
controversial area of state responsibility for extraterritorial injury caused
by pollution.
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621d. at 782.
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(b) loss sustained by an alien as the result of the death of another alien
(c) deprivation of liberty
(d) harm to reputation
(e) destruction of, damage to, or loss of property
(f)
destruction of use or enjoyment of property
(g) deprivation of means of livelihood
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(b) if, in the case of an act or omission creating an unreasonble risk of injury, the loss or detriment suffered by the injured alien occured outside the scope
of the risk.
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 148 (1969). See also Garcia Amador, Responsibility of
The State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of AliensReparation of the Injury, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 8-11 (1961), U.N. Doc.
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formative of law, whereas the term 'custom' is reserved for the law itself...
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of juridically significant acts. The word 'custom' stands for the proposition that the
practice is actually productive of law. Admittedly there is only a shade of distinction
between the two words, but they are not synonyms; the one is rather the obverse of
the other, 'practice' being suggestive of the formative process, 'custom' of its completion. Perhaps it may be said that 'practice' is evidence of the act of creation,
'custom' is the result." O'Connell, supra note 42, at 9.
65The 1922 Treaty between Germany and Denmark in Art. 45 provides that
"If refuse or harmful substances are discharged into any watercourse . . . the persons who suffer damage thereby are entitled to appeal to the Fronticr Water
Commission." 10 L.N.T.S. 73, 187, 225 (1922).
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Urundi, signed at London, 22 Nov. 1934, 190 L.N.T.S. 103, 104 (1938), prohibits
any industrial activity "which may pollute or cause the deposit of any poisonous,
noxious or polluting substance in the water."
The 1952 Agreement between Poland and the German Democratic Republic
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tier Waters, Art. 17, Signed at Berlin, 6 Feb. 1952, 304 U.N.T.S. 131, prohibits
introduction of effluents which might "affect adversely the use of water of said river
for domestic requirements, water supply, industry and agriculture." (emphasis added)
The Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and Poland Concerning
the Use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters Art. 3, signed at Prague 21 March
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(emphasis added)
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(10) 419 U.N.T.S. 125, 138-140. (emphasis added)
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economy." (emphasis added)
The agreement between Poland and the U.S.S.R. Concerning the Use of Water
Resources in Frontier Waters Art. 12, signed at Warsaw, 17 July 1964, 538 U.N.T.S.
194, requires the parties to "employ appropriate procedures for suitably purifying
sewerage . . . which may cause harmful pollution of frontier waters." (emphasis
added)
The Agreement Concerning the Niger River Commission and the Navigation
and Transport on the River Niger, Art. 12, done at Niamey, 25 Nov. 1964, 587
U.N.T.S. 19, provides that riparian states will "abstain from carrying out any works
likely to pollute the waters, or any modification likely to affect biological characteristics of its fauna and flora, without adequate notice to and prior consultation with
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259, 266, 277, 281, 292, 425, 438, 461, 467, (15 April 1963).
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the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.
The Lake Lanoux Arbitration is also of special importance because it refers
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interests. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 Int'l L. Rep. 101, 123
(1957).
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that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under international law as herein determined.
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"Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
Supra note 17.

